The emergence of the Democratic Change Party (DCP) as a Mount Kenya-based outfit spells both opportunity and trouble for UDA and the broader Kenya Kwanza coalition. Critics argue that a party whose core message is “one term” cannot unseat President William Ruto—especially now that he’s managed to chip away at Raila Odinga’s traditional strongholds. That argument isn’t baseless; Kenyan politics has long thrived on ethnic and regional blocs. According to this logic, whatever votes UDA might lose in Mt Kenya could easily be offset by gains in opposition strongholds that appear to be gravitating toward Ruto as we approach 2027.
That might hold true—especially when you consider how regions like Turkana and parts of North Eastern Kenya, which didn’t vote for Kenya Kwanza in 2022, quickly switched allegiance once Ruto assumed office. This “legacy logic” is what many regime apologists mean when they say “Wakenya ni wale wale”—that Kenyans never change. But this thinking rests on assumptions that may no longer hold water.
First, it assumes ethnic nationalism remains as potent as it once was. Historically, many Kenyans believed that political, social, and economic salvation lay in having “one of their own” in power. But the run-up to the 2022 election disrupted that thinking. Despite being led by Uhuru Kenyatta—“one of their own”—many in Mt Kenya felt sidelined by his administration. Their support for Ruto, a political outsider in the region, was a tacit admission that good leadership matters more than ethnic identity.
In 2022, Ruto received overwhelming backing from Mt Kenya, just as Raila Odinga had previously earned strong support from the Rift Valley. This shift suggested a weakening of tribal vote-banking—a pattern that, if it continues, could define 2027.
Second, Kenya Kwanza rose to power on a powerful narrative: disruptive economic change. They promised to liberate the “hustler” from the grip of dynastic elites, to lift those at the bottom of the pyramid. But nearly halfway through the term, there is scant evidence of improved lives for the common Kenyan. If anything, the situation has worsened.
The middle class has felt the pinch, and with it, a political awakening. They now understand, more than ever, that political decisions have consequences. This class—comprising salaried professionals and entrepreneurs—will be a significant force in 2027. Many are parents to the restless, tech-savvy Gen Zs who have already shown they are not afraid to speak truth to power. This convergence of an awakened middle class and mobilised Gen Z could be decisive.
Enter DCP.
It may be viewed as a regional competitor to UDA, but it is also a tool of political resistance. For Mt Kenya, DCP offers a vehicle for expressing disappointment in the current regime. It’s not just another party—it’s a symbol of defiance, a signal that discontent can be organised and channelled into electoral action. While its base is regional, its impact could be national. It challenges Kenya Kwanza’s belief that it faces no real opposition.
This complacency—this idea that “there’s no alternative”—is dangerous. It breeds voter apathy and resignation. But DCP could upend that narrative in Mt Kenya. If the broader opposition truly seeks to send this regime packing, it must treat DCP not as competition, but as critical ammunition in a shared cause.
The advantage the opposition holds is this: many Kenyans believe the regime cannot win a free and fair contest under current conditions. They assume “the system” will protect it. But the same system was defeated in 2022. Ruto did it—and so can others.
Kenyans must remember the power of the vote. No political formation—no matter how entrenched—can withstand the collective will of a mobilised majority. In 2022, Ruto offered a blueprint for how to beat the system. As it turns out, many were watching—and taking notes.
