Niv 20 – Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi has underscored that a “free and open Indo-Pacific” (FOIP) remains the cornerstone of her foreign and security policy. Yet Japanese media coverage has largely overlooked the significance of her statement — and particularly its connection to India — whether out of caution, misjudgment, or reluctance to provoke regional sensitivities.
As her mentor, the late former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, foresaw, the Indo-Pacific has become the strategic centre of gravity of the 21st century. The region is now defined by shifting power balances, contested maritime spaces, and a heightened emphasis on economic security. In this environment, Japan and India have emerged as key democratic anchors seeking to shape a rules-based regional order.
India and Japan have long articulated parallel visions — Japan’s FOIP and India’s Indo-Pacific Oceans’ Initiative (IPOI). Their convergence has gradually evolved into one of the most substantive partnerships underpinning regional stability, though challenges remain in institutional depth and long-term commitment.
Converging Strategic Visions
Both Japan and India view the Indo-Pacific as a single, interconnected strategic space stretching from the eastern coast of Africa to the western Pacific. Their emphasis on inclusivity, freedom of navigation, and international law underpins their shared approach.
Japan’s FOIP — first articulated by Abe — was the earliest comprehensive vision for this vast maritime region. India’s IPOI, launched in 2019, built on similar values, dividing cooperation into functional pillars ranging from maritime security to disaster response and trade connectivity.
Japan leads the connectivity pillar within India’s IPOI, combining its infrastructure expertise with India’s extensive diplomatic reach. Over the past few years, bilateral ties have been strengthened through structured mechanisms, including the 2+2 ministerial dialogue, which aligns foreign and defence priorities.
Security cooperation has also advanced. Japan’s 2024 decision to export defence communication antenna technology to India marked the first defence equipment transfer between the two nations. Joint military exercises such as Dharma Guardian and the JIMEX naval drills have increased interoperability and improved maritime awareness.
Deepening Economic Security Cooperation
Economic security has become the second major pillar of Japan–India relations. In 2025, both governments released a joint fact sheet outlining collaboration in semiconductors, critical minerals, and clean energy — sectors central to supply chain resilience and technological autonomy.
The Supply Chain Resilience Initiative with Australia reflects their shared goal of diversifying away from China-dependent production networks. Meanwhile, Japanese-backed projects in India — including the Mumbai–Ahmedabad High-Speed Rail and multiple road and port upgrades — underscore the material depth of the partnership.
Within the Quad, Japan and India work together on maritime domain awareness, cybersecurity, and emerging technologies. Despite this, their partnership remains flexible rather than alliance-bound, designed to uphold stability and regional autonomy rather than engage in overt containment.
Challenges and Divergences
Despite strong progress, structural constraints persist. Japan’s FOIP is deeply embedded within its alliance with the United States, while India prioritises strategic autonomy and multi-alignment. These differing strategic cultures can slow deeper security convergence.
Legal and political constraints on Japan’s defence exports also limit rapid expansion of cooperation. India’s defence manufacturing sector, although modernising quickly, continues to face capacity gaps that restrict reciprocal engagement.
Regional perceptions also remain critical. For the Indo-Pacific vision to gain legitimacy, Japan and India must ensure their partnership appears inclusive rather than exclusive. While both countries emphasise ASEAN centrality and support for Pacific Island nations, they will need to back this with sustained funding, training, and region-specific programmes.
Furthermore, much of the cooperation continues to rely on MOUs, high-level visits, and project announcements. For strategic consolidation, Japan and India must embed their partnership in deeper institutional linkages — joint research centres, shared defence production lines, trilateral maritime patrols, technology co-development, and wider people-to-people exchange programmes.
A Blueprint for Middle-Power Cooperation
For Japan, India serves as a democratic counterweight and bridge to the Western Indo-Pacific. For India, Japan is both a technologically advanced partner and an anchor in the Pacific architecture complementing its Indian Ocean focus.
Together, they are well positioned to craft a model of middle-power cooperation — one that strengthens sovereignty rather than diluting it, and one that reinforces a balanced and open regional order.
The challenge now is to translate convergence into capability. That requires sustained co-investment in critical technologies, shared standards in digital governance, coordinated maritime presence, and long-term defence and economic security frameworks.
The Indo-Pacific will remain contested and complex. But Japan and India — through steady, practical cooperation — can help ensure it remains open, predictable, and secure.
Ultimately, the success of their partnership will not be defined by declarations but by the strength and durability of the institutions they build together.
